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We present a model that allows us to compare the effects that frictions involved in immigration 
and international outsourcing have on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality. We show that, for 
any given level of contractual friction in the production of intermediate goods, the wedge 
between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers widens as the frictions in immigration 
wear out. The skilled-unskilled wage gap, for any given level of friction in immigration, is 
sensitive to variations in contractual frictions in intermediates that affect international 
outsourcing. 
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Moving People or Jobs?  
A New Perspective on Immigration and International Outsourcing 
 
 “Although immigration and international outsourcing do differ in the manner in which local wage rates 
(or employment levels) are affected, the current scare scenarios need to be placed in context.” R. W. Jones 
(2005) 
 
1.  Introduction  
  The forces of immigration to and outsourcing from the U.S. continue to draw 
increasing attention of those in the media and academics. On the one hand, U.S. legal and 
illegal immigration combined averages over 1.5 million a year. Most immigrants to the 
United States are unskilled and originate in developing countries. According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 2002 and 2012, the U.S. economy is expected to 
create 56 million new jobs, half of which will require no more than a high school 
education. More than 75 million baby boomers will retire in that period and declining 
native-born fertility rates will be approaching replacement level. Native-born workers, 
meanwhile, are becoming more educated with every decade. While in the 1960s, half of 
all Americans dropped out of high school to look for unskilled work, less than 10% do so 
now.
1 On the other hand, no economist would dispute Gregory Mankiw's
2 observation 
that outsourcing has become America’s “new way of doing international trade" which 
makes it "a good thing" but a group of politicians, journalists
3 and consulting agencies 
continue to warn against “export of jobs” to countries like India, Brazil and China. While 
academic interest in international migration dates back to the early 20th century, the 
literature on outsourcing has far outpaced that on immigration.
4 With this backdrop, in 
this article, we offer a new perspective on the labor market effects of immigration by 
embedding it in a model of outsourcing subject to contractual incompleteness.  Moving People or Jobs? 
2 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
review of the relevant literature. In section 3, we present our model and propositions. We 
draw our conclusion section 4.  
2.  Literature 
  Academic interest in identifying the forces behind international migration dates back 
to Jerome (1926). However, in the early 1990s the absence of a coherent theory of 
immigration began to trouble several researchers
5 as conflicts between key empirical 
regularities and the predictions of existing theories of immigration were becoming 
increasingly conspicuous. Stark (1994) remarked that one of the least satisfactory features 
of theories of immigration, available at that time, was their lack of ability to predict a 
corpus of stylized facts rather than provide an ad hoc analytical rationale for an isolated 
observation. Massey and Zenteto (1999) argued that immigration is “path dependent” 
since choices made by a few early immigrants determine the direction of the floodtide 
that follows as networks tend to create a momentum for immigration. Chiswick (2000) 
offered a variant of the human capital investment model of migration where an individual 
computes the gross benefit to migration, based on the wage difference in the source and 
the destination, and compares it with the cost of migration, which could include both 
foregone earnings and direct costs. Hendricks (2001) developed a model of immigration 
with positive assortative matching under incomplete information in which worker skills 
are complementary in production and only imperfectly observable by firms. 
  The phenomenon of outsourcing is certainly not new. Yet it has appeared more 
frequently in the recent literature on international trade. Several authors, including Jones 
and Engerman (1996), Jones and Kierzkowski (1998, 2001, 2003),  Arndt (1998), Moving People or Jobs? 
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Deardorff (1998), Harris (1998), Grossman and Helpman (1999), Jones (2000), Jones and 
Marjit (2001), Marjit et al (2003), Kohler (2004), Wan (2005), Long (2005), and Jones, 
Kierzkowski, and Lurong (2005) have captured distinct dimensions of outsourcing 
through parsimonious yet meaningful modifications of the traditional structure of general 
equilibrium models of international trade.  
  The traditional theories of trade and their refinements have had much to offer in terms 
of explaining the phenomenon and consequences of outsourcing (Jones (2000)). Still 
continued attempts at understanding the complex organizational arrangements 
encompassed by the process of transnational production sharing, have given birth to a 
growing body of literature beyond traditional trade theories that treated the choice of a 
firm’s organizational form as exogenous by focusing on the production and sale of final 
goods and/or on arms-length transactions while incorporating trade in intermediate 
goods. Some notable contributions include Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005), 
Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) 
and Acemoglu et al (2007). 
  We hope to complement these contributions by embedding immigration in a model of 
outsourcing subject to contractual incompleteness.   
3.  Model and Propositions 
 Consider
6 a world that has three countries (indexed by j = 0, 1, 2) and ends in two 
periods (indexed by t = 0, 1). In the initial period, each country is endowed with only 
unskilled labor (
0 j
u L ) that produces only one non-traded homogeneous agricultural good 
(X) using constant-returns-to-scale technology. Each unskilled worker is rewarded
jt
u w . 
We assume that unskilled workers live for two periods and
20 10 00
u u u w w w = > .  In the final Moving People or Jobs? 
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u L L = ) but country 0 
(the home country where the research center is located) is endowed with an additional 
pool of skilled workers (
01
s L ) who live for one period. Each skilled worker in country 0 is 
rewarded
01
s w . 
Country 1 is the origin of exogenous immigration flows of unskilled labor to country 0 
and country 2 is the destination for outsourcing from country 0. Letµ represent the 
premium, due to friction in immigration, necessary to induce a worker to move from 
country 1 to country 0 i.e. the wage of an unskilled worker in the home country 0 
is
11 01 ) 1 ( u u w w µ + = .   
In the final period, a single firm produces a brand of a diﬀerentiated product (Y), for 
which it faces an iso-elastic demand function
7:  
(1)      1
1
− = α λ p y     ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α     
where p is the price of the good. Production of good Y is characterized by: 




h z x x y
− =
1 ξ       ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ z     
The revenue generated is: 




h z x x R
α α α αξ λ
) 1 ( 1 − − =  .    ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α , ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ z  
Here
) 1 ( ) 1 (
z z
z z z
− − − − = ξ ,  h x  is a high-tech intermediate good (e.g. research and 
development, marketing etc.) and  l x  is a low-tech intermediate good (e.g. manufacturing, 
assembly etc.). The skilled-unskilled wage-ratio (ω ), in general equilibrium, for the 
home country is: Moving People or Jobs? 
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where ) (z f  is the probability density function associated with the fraction of 
manufacturing plants employing native unskilled workers. 
FIGURE1 ABOUT HERE 
Each intermediate, i x  ( l h i , = ), can be of high or low quality. If either of the two 
intermediates is of low quality, the output of the final good is zero. If both intermediates 
are of high quality, production of the final good requires no additional inputs. In country 
0, production of one unit of a good-quality high-tech intermediate requires the 
employment of one unit of skilled labor. Since country 0 alone is endowed with skilled 
workers  h x  is produced exclusively in country 0. Production of the high-quality low-tech 
intermediate requires unskilled labor and the unit input requirement is assumed to be 
equal to 1. 
The sequence of events is as follows. At t =1, a research center located in the home 
country,  decides whether to produce the high-tech intermediate and, if so, whether to 
obtain the low-tech intermediate from an independent manufacturing plant in country 0 
that hires unskilled immigrant workers from country 1 or from a manufacturing plant in 
country 2 to maximize its ex ante profits. Upon entry, the manufacturer makes a lump-
sum transfer T to the research center. Because of the existence of a large number of 
identical potential manufacturers of the final good, competition among them will make T 
adjust so as to exhaust the manufacturer’s profits. The source of contractual 
incompleteness arises from international production sharing
8: the manager of the research 
center in country 0 and that of a manufacturing plant can not sign an enforceable contract Moving People or Jobs? 
6 
specifying the purchase of a certain type of intermediate input for a certain price. 
Otherwise, the party receiving a positive payment would have an incentive to produce the 
low-quality intermediate at a negligible cost. The parties can not write contracts 
contingent on the volume of sale revenues obtained when the final good is sold. The only 
contractible ex ante is the transfer between the parties.  
















































Proposition 1. As the friction in immigration falls (rises), the skilled-unskilled wage gap 
rises (falls) in the home country. 
Proof: Consider first the decision of the research center in country 0 to transact with an 
independent manufacturer located in country 0 that hires unskilled workers migrating 
from country 1 to country 0. This leaves no room for ex post renegotiation between the 
research center and the manufacturer since the two parties can write an ex ante quality-
contingent contract. Using backward induction, the research center’s problem is to 
Maximize:  l u h s x w x w R
11 01 0 ) 1 ( µ + − − = Π  
 
 
The ex ante profits, with immigration (IMM), for the research center boils down to 
(5)   () ( )
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Consider next the decision of the research center in country 0 to transact with an 
independent manufacturer that is located in country 2 and employs unskilled workers 
located in country 2. In this case, the initial contract between the research center and the 
manufacturer stipulates only the transfer (T). The research center chooses  h x  and the 
manufacturer chooses  s x  simultaneously. The research center and the manufacturer play 
a simultaneous game in the initial stage. The problem of the research center is to 




− = Π  
{} h x  
The problem of the manufacturer is to 
 
 




− = Π  
{} l x  
 
The ex ante profits, with outsourcing (OUT), for the research center boils down to 
(6)   () ()






























Therefore, the research center is indifferent between transacting with an independent 
manufacturer located in country 0 that hires unskilled immigrants from country 1 and 
outsourcing to an independent manufacturer located in country 2 if  OUT R IMM R Π = Π  
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A and ∞ =
→ A
0 lim
µ , a decline inµ  below a threshold will 
support immigration raising the skilled-unskilled wage gap in country 0. [QED] 
  Let us now allow variations in the degree of contractual frictions, á la Acemoglu et al 
(2007). We assume that the low-tech intermediate input is produced with a set of 
activities, indexed by points on an interval [0, 1], subject to a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
(7)        ∫ =
1
0
) ( log dk k x
l
l e x     
where ) (k xl represents the manufacturer’s input-specific investment in activity k that can 
be used only to produce the input for which it is designed. The activities in the range 
] , 0 [ β are subject to contractual incompleteness i.e. the characteristics of these activities 
can not be fully specified in advance in an enforceable ex-ante contract.  
 
Proposition 2. As contractual frictions in the low-tech intermediate decline (rise), for any 
given level of friction in immigration, the skilled-unskilled wage inequality falls (rises) in 
the home country. 
Proof: With immigration, the research center’s problem is to 








The ex ante profits the research center is: 
(8)   () ( )
























With outsourcing, the problem of the research center is to 
{} { }
β
0 ) ( , = k l h k x xMoving People or Jobs? 
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The problem of the manufacturer is to 
 
Maximize:  ∫ − = Π
β
0
21 2 ) (
2
1
dk k x w R l u  
 
 
The ex ante profits for the research center is 
(9)   () ( )











































u β > . A decline in β , for any given level ofµ , below a threshold will support 
outsourcing that will lower the skilled-unskilled wage gap in country 0. [QED] 
  Finally we allow the degree of contractual frictions to vary in both the intermediates 
(low-tech and high-tech) i.e. each intermediate is produced with a set of activities subject 
to a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
(10)       ∫ =
1
0
) ( log dk k x
i
i e x    ( i = h, l) 
where ) (k xi represents input-specific investments in activity k. The activities in the range 
] , 0 [ i β are subject to contractual incompleteness.  
{} { }
β
0 ) ( = k l k xMoving People or Jobs? 
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Proposition 3.  As contractual frictions in the high-tech intermediate decline (rise) 
relative to the frictions in low-tech intermediate the skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
rises (declines) in the home country. 
Proof: With immigration, the research center’s problem is to 
Maximize:        ∫ ∫ + − − = Π
l h










The ex ante profits the research center is: 
(11)   () ( )
























With outsourcing, the problem of the research center is to 
Maximize:  ∫ − = Π
h
dk k x w R h s
β
0






The problem of the manufacturer is to 
 
Maximize:  ∫ − = Π
l
dk k x w R l u
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The ex ante profits for the research center is 
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> . A decline in h β , all else equal, below a threshold will support 
immigration raising the skilled-unskilled wage gap in country 0. [QED] 
In sum, for any given level of contractual friction in the production of intermediate 
goods, the wedge between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers widens as the 
frictions in immigration wear out. The skilled-unskilled wage gap, for any given level of 
friction in immigration, can widen or shrink depending on the contractual frictions in 
intermediates that affect international outsourcing. 
4.  Conclusion 
 
  We have presented a model of immigration in the presence of the possibility of 
offshore outsourcing where we demonstrate how interactions between the frictions 
involved in immigration and outsourcing can affect the skilled-unskilled wage inequality. 
We have shown that the skilled-unskilled wage inequality, while affected by frictions in 
immigration, is sensitive to variations in contractual frictions in intermediates that affect 
international outsourcing. In particular, we predict that a fall in the friction involved in 
immigration will cause the skilled-unskilled wage gap to widen while the gap would be 
dampened by a decline in the contractual frictions in the low-tech intermediates. A 
decline in the contractual frictions in the high-tech intermediate relative to the frictions in 
low-tech intermediate will increase the wage gap. A natural extension, we are currently 
working on, of our model is to integrate it with the structure of Antràs and Helpman 
(2007) allowing cross-country variations in the degrees of contractual frictions. Since this Moving People or Jobs? 
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is an emerging area of research, we hope that future researchers will extend our work 
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Endnotes 
                                                           
1 See Jacoby (2006). 
2 At the time of this quote, Gregory Mankiw was the head of President George W. Bush’s Council of 
Economic Advisors. 
3 CNN's Lou Dobbs routinely harangues U.S. companies engaged in offshore outsourcing in his "Exporting 
America" series. Many IT executives have themselves contributed to this perception. When IBM 
announced plans to outsource 3,000 jobs overseas this year, one of its executives said, "[Globalization] 
means shifting a lot of jobs, opening a lot of locations in places we had never dreamt of before, going 
where there's low-cost labor, low-cost competition, shifting jobs offshore." Nandan Nilekani, the chief 
executive of the India-based Infosys Technologies, said at this year's World Economic Forum, "Everything 
you can send down a wire is up for grabs." In January testimony before Congress, Hewlett-Packard chief 
Carly Fiorina warned that "there is no job that is America's God-given right anymore." 
4 In a thought-provoking article on the labor market effects of U.S. immigration and outsourcing, Jones 
(2005) pointed out the significance of substitutability/complementarity between immigration and 
outsourcing. 
5 See Massey et al. (1993). 
6 From an analytical perspective, our model incorporates the possibility of international migration in 
Antràs’ (2005) structure to compare the effects of immigration and outsourcing on the skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality. Antràs (2005) combined incomplete international outsourcing contracts with a model 
North-South trade to explain the development of product cycles in which new goods are initially designed 
and produced in the North, with later production moving to the South. For ease of comparison, we preserve 
his notations to the fullest extent possible.  
7 This form of demand results from constant elasticity-of-substitution preferences for brands of a 
diﬀerentiated product. 
8 See Antràs (2005) for a more detailed discussion. 
 
 